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ABSTRACT
The U.S. wage structure evolved across the last century: narrowing from 1910 to 1950, fairly stable
in the 1950s and 1960s, widening rapidly during the 1980s, and “polarizing” since the late 1980s. 
We document the spectacular rise of U.S. wage inequality after 1980 and place recent changes into
a century-long historical perspective to understand the sources of change.  The majority of the increase
in wage inequality since 1980 can be accounted for by rising educational wage differentials, just as
a substantial part of the decrease in wage inequality in the earlier era can be accounted for by decreasing
educational wage differentials.  
 Although skill-biased technological change has generated rapid growth in the relative demand for
more-educated workers for at least the past century, increases in the supply of skills, from rising educational
attainment of the U.S. work force, more than kept pace for most of the twentieth century.  Since 1980,
however, a sharp decline in skill supply growth driven by a slowdown in the rise of educational attainment
of successive U.S. born cohorts has been a major factor in the surge in educational wage differentials.
Polarization set in during the late 1980s with employment shifts into high- and low-wage jobs at the
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Activity commenced—America enjoyed widespread prosperity.  Not only did the nation grow 
rapidly, all parts of the income distribution expanded at fairly similar rates.  America was 
“growing together.”  But in the mid-1970s, economic growth slowed.  By the early 1980s the 
wage structure began a period of widening that has lasted until the present day.  Even though 
productivity growth surged again starting in the mid-1990s, the benefits of economic growth 
have been concentrated at the top end of the distribution.
1  America has been “growing apart.” 
The “growing together” and “growing apart” patterns are shown in Figure 1, which 
compares real income growth across the family income distribution for the postwar period before 
and after 1973.  For the pre-1973 period, real income growth was a bit faster near the bottom of 
the income distribution and somewhat slower near the top, making the changes modestly 
equalizing.  In sharp contrast, for 1973 to 2005 family incomes virtually stagnated for the lowest 
quintile but grew more than three times as rapidly for the top 5 percent as for the middle group.   
Since most Americans make their living from work, it should not come as a surprise that 
changes in the labor market and the distribution of wages have been the driving force behind the 
rising disparity in the economic fortunes of American families.
2  We document the nature of 
rising U.S. wage inequality since 1980 and place the recent changes into a century-long historical 
perspective to understand the sources of change.   
The widening of the wage structure that began in the early 1980s differed markedly from 
the wage structure changes of the early- to mid-twentieth century.  The wage structure narrowed 
substantially during the first half of the twentieth century and was relatively stable during the 
                                                 
1 See Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) on the changing distribution of the benefits of U.S. productivity 
growth. 
2 Burtless (1999) assesses the contribution of changes in the inequality of labor market earnings to rising 
family income inequality.   2 
1950s and 1960s. 
The spreading out of the wage structure since 1980 occurred in two stages.  From 1980 to 
around 1987, wage inequality increased in a rapid and monotonic fashion.  The top grew most 
rapidly, the middle less rapidly, and the bottom the least of all.  Since the late 1980s the upper-
end of the wage distribution has continued to grow rapidly relative to the middle, but the lower 
part has not lost out relative to the middle.  These recent wage structure changes have been 
associated with a “polarization” of the U.S. labor market with employment shifting into high- 
and low-wage jobs at the expense of middle-wage positions.
3  Another key point we will make is 
that the majority of the increase in wage inequality since 1980 can be accounted for by rising 
educational wage differentials. 
Why has the wage structure widened so much since 1980?  A popular explanation 
attributes the primary role to an increase in the rate of growth of the relative demand for more 
skilled workers coming about from skill-biased technological changes and a re-organization of 
work driven by the spread of computer-based technologies.
4  Globalization pressures, eroding 
labor market institutions, and changes in the social norms that constrain pay disparities have also 
been offered as explanations and each appears to have played some role.
5  Our focus is on re-
assessing the skill-biased technological change hypothesis in a long-run historical context.   
Skill-biased technological change is not a new phenomenon.  Rather, it has driven rapid 
secular growth in the relative demand for more-educated workers for at least a century.  During 
                                                 
3 The polarization terminology is borrowed from Goos and Manning (2007) who document similar recent 
changes in the employment patterns for Britain and has been used for the United States by Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney (2006). 
4 See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) and Card and DiNardo (2002) for contrasting evaluations of the 
role of technological change in U.S. wage structure changes. 
5 See Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) on the impacts of trade and immigration; and see DiNardo, Fortin 
and Lemieux (1996) and Levy and Temin (2007) on institutions and social norms.  Katz and Autor (1999) 
provide an overview of alternative approaches to modeling and measuring wage structure changes.   3 
most of the twentieth century the narrowing of the wage structure came about largely because the 
supply of skills grew faster than did the demand for skills.  Growth in the relative demand for 
skills was produced largely by skill-biased technological change.  Skill supply growth was due 
primarily to the rising educational attainment of successive cohorts.  That, in turn, was fueled by 
increased access to public high schools and later to colleges and universities.  The upshot of 
these changes was that the wage structure and educational wage differentials narrowed from 
1915 to 1980, especially from 1915 to 1950.   
Relative demand shifts favoring more-educated workers have not been particularly rapid 
since 1980.  Instead, the growth of the supply of skills slowed considerably after 1980 and the 
wage structure, in consequence, widened.  The deceleration in the relative supply of skills of the 
working population came about largely from a slowdown in the growth in the educational 
attainment of U.S. natives for cohorts born since 1950.  In contrast, the increase in unskilled 
immigration accounts for only a small part of the post-1980 slowdown in skill supply growth. 
Although the overall rate of relative demand shifts for more-skilled workers does not 
appear to have accelerated since 1980, computerization and foreign offshoring have changed the 
nature of demand shifts.  Skill-biased technological change has increased the relative demand for 
skill in a rather monotonic manner across most of the past century.  But computerization, a recent 
form of skill-biased technological change, has increased the relative demand for skill in a non-
monotonic manner.  Computers strongly complement the non-routine or abstract tasks of high-
wage jobs, but they directly substitute for the routine tasks found in many traditional middle-
wage jobs.  However, computers have little impact on the non-routine manual tasks of many 
low-wage service jobs.  Furthermore, this pattern of demand shifts appears to have been 
reinforced by international offshoring.  The consequence of these changes is a polarization of   4 
labor demand that has led to rapidly growing inequality in top half of distribution with little or no 
change in inequality in the bottom half of the distribution.   
I.  The Evolution of the U.S. Wage Structure 
Two large and representative household data sets have been widely used to document 
changes in the U.S. wage structure over recent decades.
6  The March Current Population Survey 
(CPS) micro-data provide reasonably comparable information for the past four decades on (prior 
year’s) earnings, weeks worked, and full- and part-time work status.  We use the March files 
from 1964 to 2006 (covering earnings years 1963 to 2005) to examine the evolution of weekly 
earnings of full-time, full-year workers (FTFY; those working 35 or more hours per week for 40 
or more weeks in the year).  We complement the March CPS FTFY series with point-in-time 
data on the hourly wages of all wage and salary workers using May CPS samples for 1973 to 
1978 and CPS Outgoing Rotation Group samples for 1979 to 2006 (CPS MORG).
7 
Individual-level data from the federal population censuses on labor market earnings for 
the previous calendar year, weeks and hours worked, and educational attainment allow us to 
track the wage structure since 1939.
8  Since no national sample exists giving all parts of the wage 
structure before 1939, we have pieced together data from various sources to track wage structure 
changes from 1890 to 1940.  These sources include individual-level data on earnings and 
educational attainment from the 1915 Iowa state census, wage distributions for manufacturing 
                                                 
6 See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), Katz and Autor (1999), Lemieux (2006b, 2007), and Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007) for comprehensive descriptions of recent U.S. wage structure changes. 
7 Our wage tabulations from the March CPS and CPS MORG files cover wage and salary workers aged 
16 to 64 years and follow the data processing steps documented in the Data Appendix to Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney (2008).  
8 Social Security Administration individual-level longitudinal annual earnings data starting in 1937 have 
recently become available, but these data do not include information on educational attainment or on 
weeks and hours worked.  Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) use these data to examine inequality and 
mobility from 1937 to 2004.   5 
industries for 1890 to the 1940s, and occupational wage series.
9 
A.  Recent U.S. Wage Structure Changes 
Inequality in hourly, weekly, and annual earnings has increased substantially since 1980 
for men, for women, and for both combined.  The weekly earnings of the 90
th percentile FTFY 
worker relative to the 10
th percentile FTFY worker increased by 40 log points (49 percent) for 
both men and for women separately from 1980 to 2005 in the March CPS.  Expanded wage 
differentials by education, occupation, and age (or experience) combined with rising within-
group (residual) wage dispersion have all contributed to the rise in wage inequality.  The increase 
in the relative earnings of college graduates, and those with advanced degrees, has been 
particularly large.  The weekly earnings of those with exactly a bachelor’s degree increased by 
22 log points and those with a post-college degree rose by 34 log points relative to those with 
exactly a high school degree for FTFY workers from 1980 to 2005.  An offsetting factor has 
been a substantial narrowing of gender wage differential since 1980.  But the 90-10 log weekly 
wage gap for FTFY males and females combined nevertheless increased by 26 log points from 
1.33 in 1980 to 1.59 in 2005. 
Rising wage inequality since 1980 was not significantly offset, and, for some measures, 
actually appears to have been reinforced, by changes in non-wage benefits and workplace 
amenities.
10  Although transitory earnings variation increased in the 1980s, the bulk of the rise of 
cross-section wage inequality was driven by relatively permanent components of earnings 
                                                 
9 See Goldin and Katz (2008) for the details on these data sets and on the wage structure from 1890 to 
1940. 
10 Pierce (2001, table IV) using the comprehensive microdata on components of employee compensation 
collected to construct the Employment Cost Index (ECI) finds that the 90-10 log hourly total 
compensation differential increased by 0.202 from 1982 to 1996 while the 90-10 log hourly wage 
differential increased by a modestly smaller amount (0.181) over the same period.  And Hamermesh 
(1999) finds that increases in the inequality of working conditions in the 1980s and early 1990s served to 
exacerbate increases in wage inequality.   6 
variation including rising returns to education.
11  Earnings inequality expanded even more when 
one moves beyond standard household data sets to data on tax returns that have better 
information on the top 1 percent of the annual earnings distribution.
12  But large changes in the 
wage distribution for the bottom 99 percent group remain. 
Figure 2 illustrates the timing and the key components of the recent rise in U.S. wage 
inequality.  Three aspects of wage inequality are displayed for the March FTFY weekly sample 
covering 1963 to 2005 (Panel A) and for the CPS MORG hourly wage sample covering 1973 to 
2006 (Panel B): the 90-10 overall log wage differential (for males), the 90-10 residual log wage 
differential (for males), and the college-high school log wage differential (for males and females 
combined).  The three measures of inequality rose rapidly and in tandem during the 1980s and 
then grew more slowly (or flattened) in the 1990s and 2000s.  But the college wage premium 
increased substantially in the 1960s when residual inequality was quiescent, and the premium 
declined in the 1970s when residual inequality increased (March CPS) or was flat (CPS MORG).  
Thus, the rise in wage inequality has not been a unitary phenomenon.  
All three measures of hourly wage inequality from the CPS MORG display large 
increases in the first-part of the 1980s but, in contrast to the March CPS FTFY series, residual 
inequality stopped growing after the mid-1980s for hourly wages in the CPS MORG.  The 
greater increase in wage inequality since the mid-1980s for full-time weekly wages in the March 
CPS than for hourly wages in the CPS MORG partly reflects an increasingly positive covariance 
of weekly hours and hourly wages even among full-time workers and likely reflects the growing 
importance of performance pay (such as annual bonuses), which is presumed to be better 
                                                 
11See, for example, Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007). 
12 See Piketty and Saez (2003, 2007) who document that the share of wage income accruing to the top 1 
percent of tax units increased from 6.43 percent in 1980 to 11.62 percent in 2005.   7 
reported in the March CPS earnings measure.
13   
B.  Divergent Upper- and Lower-Tail Wage Inequality 
Underlying the rapid growth of overall wage inequality in the 1980s, followed by 
deceleration in the 1990s, is a divergence in inequality trends in the upper-half and bottom-half 
of the wage distribution.  The divergence is shown in Figure 3, which contrasts trends in the 90-
50 and 50-10 log hourly wage differentials for all workers over the past three decades.   
Substantial increases in wage inequality occurred in both the upper-half (90-50) and 
lower-half (50-10) of the distribution from 1979 to 1987 expanding the 90-10 log wage 
differential by 18 log points.  But the trends in upper-half and lower-half wage inequality 
diverged after 1987 with upper-half wage inequality continuing to rise steadily and lower-half 
wage inequality ceasing to rise (and actually contracting by 4 log points from 1987 to 2005).
14  
Furthermore, the divergence of upper-half and lower-half inequality since the mid-1980s is also 
apparent for more comprehensive measures of compensation (that include the value of employee 
benefits) and does not simply reflect the disproportionate recent increases in the burden of (and 
wage offsets from) rising health insurance benefits costs for middle-wage workers.
15   
To show more precisely where in the wage distribution the divergence of upper- and 
lower-tail wage inequality occurred, we plot cumulative log hourly real wage growth by wage 
                                                 
13 Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2007) document the rising incidence of performance pay and its role in 
rising wage inequality in the upper 20 percent of the wage distribution.  The extent to which the growth in 
performance pay represents an institutional change that increases pay dispersion for a given distribution 
of worker productivities as opposed to a mechanism by which employers accommodate a growing 
dispersion of  workers productivities (such as from skill-biased technological change) is difficult to 
disentangle and remains a key topic for future research. 
14 Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) document similar patterns of divergence of upper-half and lower-half 
wage inequality trends after 1987 for men and women separately and for both hourly and weekly 
earnings. 
15 Pierce (2001, 2007) using the microdata from the ECI finds that the 90-50 log hourly total 
compensation differential increased by 0.108 from 1984 to 1996 and by 0.033 from 1994 to 2005.  In 
contrast, the 50-10 log hourly total compensation differential decreased by 0.040 from 1984 to 1996 and 
by 0.022 from 1994 to 2005.   8 
percentile for 1974 to 1988 and for 1988 to 2005 in Figure 4.  An almost linear spreading out of 
the wage distribution (from the 4
th to the 96
th percentile) is apparent from 1974 to 1988, driven 
by changes in the first half of the 1980s.  Wage growth, in contrast, has polarized since 1988.  
The 1988 to 2005 line shows modestly faster wage growth near the bottom than in the middle of 
the distribution and a continued spreading out of the wage distribution in the top quintile.   
C.  Contribution of Increased Returns to Education to Rising Wage Inequality 
Expanded educational wage differentials have been a key component of the rise in wage 
dispersion since 1980.  How much of the overall rise in wage inequality is due to increased 
returns to schooling?  An intuitive answer to the question is as follows.  We first use our 1980 
and 2005 CPS MORG samples to estimate a modified Mincerian human capital earnings 
regressions with log hourly wages as the dependent variable run on a linear spline in years of 
schooling with break points after 12 and 16 years of schooling; a quartic in experience; race, 
region, and gender dummies; and interactions of gender and the experience quartic.  The linear 
spline in education allows the returns to education to differ for K-12, college, and post-college 
schooling.  We then adjust individual wages in the 1980 sample by imposing the 2005 returns to 
schooling and compare the distributions of actual and adjusted wages in 1980 to determine what 
wage inequality would have been in 1980 with education returns kept at 2005 levels.
16  Wages in 
2005 are analogously adjusted by imposing the 1980 education returns.  We then use the average 
of the results of these two simulations. 
Our estimates of the earnings regressions for 1980 and 2005 imply that the returns to 
schooling both increased and “convexified.”  Returns to a year of K-12 schooling between 1980 
                                                 
16We adjust 1980 wages for each individual to incorporate 2005 returns to education as follows: we calculate, for 
each of three educational categories (K-12, college, and postcollege), the product of the individual’s years of 
schooling in that category and the difference in estimated annual returns to schooling in that category between 2005 
and 1980; we then add the sum of these three results to each individual’s 1980 wage.    9 
and 2005 rose by 0.9 log points from 0.063 to 0.072, but returns to a year of college rose by 5.3 
log points from 0.076 to 0.129 and returns to year of post-college (graduate and professional) 
schooling rose by 6.9 log points from 0.073 to 0.142.  The growing convexification of education 
returns has played a key role in the divergence of upper- and lower-tail inequality since the late 
1980s. 
Our simulations show that the increase in schooling returns (almost entirely from the rise 
in returns to post-secondary schooling) served to increase the variance of log hourly wages by 
0.053 from 1980 to 2005.  Thus, 65 percent of the actual overall variance increase of 0.081 (from 
0.248 in 1980 to 0.329 in 2005) for men and women combined can be accounted for by increased 
returns to schooling.  Increased education returns can also account for an increase in the 90-10 
log hourly wage differential of 0.133 or about 55 percent of the overall increase of 0.241.  In 
separate analyses by sex, we find that rising education returns explain 62 percent of the growth 
of hourly wage variance for men and 37 percent for women.  Our results reinforce the findings of 
Thomas Lemieux and his collaborators that rising education returns represent the largest 
component of recent increases in U.S. male wage inequality.
17  
D.  Long-Run U.S. Wage Inequality Changes 
How does the recent expansion of wage inequality and educational wage differentials fit 
into the longer-term evolution of the U.S. wage structure?  We use the Integrated Public Use 
Micro-samples from the 1940 to 1970 decennial censuses (Census IPUMS) to extend our March 
CPS series on overall male FTFY weekly wage inequality (from Figure 2, panel A) back to 1939.  
The series on the male 90-10 log weekly wage differential for 1939 to 2005 is shown in Figure 5.   
                                                 
17 Lemieux (2006a) using a formal variance decomposition finds that higher returns to post-secondary 
education explain 55 percent of the rise of male log hourly wage variance from 1973-5 to 2003-5.  Firpo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (2007) using a non-parametric decomposition find that rising education returns can 
explain 0.067 (or 54 percent) of a 0.125 rise in the male 90-50 log hourly wage gap and over 100 percent 
of increased wage variance for 1988 to 2005.   10 
The growth of wage inequality since the late 1970s was preceded by a substantial 
narrowing of the wage structure during the “Great Compression” of the 1940s when the male 90-
10 log weekly wage gap decreased by 35 log points and then by a period of little change in wage 
inequality during the 1950s and 1960s.
18   Also plotted in Figure 5 is a continuous series for 1937 
to 2004 from Social Security Administration earnings history data on annual earnings inequality 
(the Gini coefficient) for male commerce and industry workers constructed by Wojciech 
Kopczuk, Emmanuel Saez, and Jae Song.
 19   The time series pattern is similar to the Census/CPS 
weekly wage inequality series and reveals that the great narrowing of wages in the 1940s 
continued until 1953 although it was sharpest during World War II.  Both series indicate the 
surge in wage inequality during 1980s undid the changes of the Great Compression and that male 
earnings inequality is higher today than at any time at least back to the 1930s.   
We use the Census IPUMS data to examine educational wage differentials back to 1940 
and link the results to data we collected from the 1915 Iowa state census to create a consistent 
measure of education returns back to 1915.  Figure 6 plots the college and high school graduate 
wage premiums from 1915 to 2005.  The college and high school wage premiums were 
exceptionally high in 1915 when white-collar workers (even ordinary clerks) were considered by 
many to be a “non-competing” group.  A high school education was, at the time, the ticket to 
most white-collar and top blue-collar jobs, and high school graduates were a more elite class than 
college graduates are today.
20  Educational wage differentials narrowed substantially from 1915 
to 1940 and again in the 1940s.  The college wage premium today has come full circle to its level 
                                                 
18 See Goldin and Margo (1992) on the period they deem the “Great Compression.” 
19 Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007). 
20 See Goldin and Katz (2000, 2008) on education returns, occupational wage differentials, and non-
competing groups in the early twentieth century.  Goldin and Katz (2008, table 1.2) find that 14.6 percent 
of the Iowa work force had at least a high school degree in 1915 and that under 12 percent of the U.S. 
work force had a high degree in 1915 as compared with 30 percent having a college degree in 2005.     11 
in 1915, but the high school wage premium is lower today than in the early twentieth century. 
Although we do not have nationally-representative samples to measure the full wage 
structure prior to the end of the 1930s, we have uncovered a wide range of data on different parts 
of the wage structure from, 1890 to 1940.  All of our sources indicate a substantial narrowing of 
the wage structure after 1910 to 1940, especially during the World War I years.  Declines in 
overall earnings dispersion among manual workers in manufacturing, occupational wage 
differentials between skilled and less skilled manual workers, and white-collar to blue-collar 
wage differentials reinforce the findings in Figure 6 of shrinking educational wage differentials 
from 1915 to 1940.
21  We conclude that wage inequality and wage differentials by occupation 
and education shrank substantially during the first half of twentieth century. 
Over the long-run the U.S. wage structure has followed a progression from narrowing to 
widening to polarizing.  A substantial narrowing occurred from 1910 to 1950 and relative 
stability characterized the 1950s and 1960s.  A sharp monotonic widening ensued in the 1980s 
and the wage structure has polarized since the late 1980s.  Even though educational wage 
differentials and overall wage inequality do not always move closely together in the short run 
(such as during parts of the 1970s), changes in education returns have played a major role in 
declining wage inequality in the first half of the twentieth century and rising wage inequality 
over the last three decades.  In fact, our estimates imply the majority of the increase in U.S. wage 
inequality since 1980 can be accounted for by increased returns to education (dominated by large 
increases in returns to college and post-college schooling).  Thus, an understanding of the driving 
forces behind long-run changes in the educational wage differentials is essential to understanding 
recent U.S. wage structure changes. 
 
                                                 
21 See Goldin and Katz (2008, chapter 2).   12 
II.  The Race between the Supply of and Demand for Skills, 1915 to 2005 
We model changes in educational wage differentials using the conceptual framework of a 
race between the supply of skills (driven by changes in the educational attainment of the work 
force) and the demand for skills (driven by skill-biased technological change).
22  We apply this 
approach to understand the evolution of the college wage premium from 1915 to 2005.  
Our illustrative framework starts with a CES production function for aggregate output Q 
with two factors, skilled workers (S) and unskilled workers (U): 
[ ] Q a L b L t t t S t t U t t = + - a a
r r r ( ) ( )( ) 1
1
            (1) 
where  
t S L and 
t U L are the quantities of skilled labor and unskilled labor employed in period t, at 
and bt represent skilled and unskilled labor augmenting technological change,  t a   is a time-
varying technology parameter that can be interpreted as indexing the share of work activities 
allocated to skilled labor.  The production function parameter ￿ is related tosSU , the aggregate 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, such thats r SU = -
1
1 .  Skill-neutral 
technological improvements raise at and bt by the same proportion.  Increases in  ) / ( t t b a  or in t a  
both represent skill-biased technological change.  We focus on the college/high school divide so 
that skilled workers (S) are “college equivalents” (college graduates plus half of those with some 
college) and unskilled workers (U) are “high school equivalents” (those with 12 or fewer years 
of schooling and half of those with some college). 
                                                 
22 The notion that long-run changes in the wage structure are an outcome of a race between education and 
technology is further developed in Goldin and Katz (2007, 2008) and dates back to Tinbergen (1974) and 
Freeman (1975).  We follow the specific analytical framework and empirical methods developed by Katz 
and Murphy (1992).    13 
Under the assumption that college and high school equivalents are paid their marginal 
products, we can use equation (1) to solve for the ratio of the marginal products of the two skill 
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where t D , measured in log quantity units, depends on the skill-biased technological change 
parameters and indexes relative demand shifts favoring college equivalents.
23  The terms in 
brackets in equation (2) show how the evolution of the college wage premium depends on a race 
between the relative demand for and supply of skills.  The aggregate elasticity of substitution 
between college and high school equivalents (sSU ) is the key parameter determining how much 
changes in skill supplies affect the college wage premium.  The greater is sSU , the smaller is the 
impact of shift in relative supplies on wages and the greater must be fluctuations in demand 
shifts ( t D ) for any given time series of relative wages to be consistent with a given time series of 
relative quantities. 
How important have been skill supply and skill demand shifts in the evolution of the 
college wage premium series from 1915 to 2005 as shown in Figure 6?  We directly measure the 
college wage premium and the relative supply of college equivalents. Assuming a plausible value 
forsSU , we then use equation (2) to generate an implied time series of relative demand shifts 
( t D ).  Our preferred model estimated on national data for 1914 to 2005 with demand shifts given 
by smooth time trends and an allowance for institutional wage-setting in the 1940s indicates that 
a 10 percent increase in relative skill supplies reduces the college wage premium by 6.1 percent 
                                                 
23  ). / ln( ) 1 ( )] 1 /( ln[ t t SU t t SU t b a D - + - = s a a s    14 
implying sSU = 1.64.
24  We also find little evidence thatsSU , measured in this manner, has 
changed much over the last century.  A value for sSU of 1.64 is consistent with a large empirical 
literature typically finding sSU  in the range of 1 to 2.5 from the estimation of extended versions 
of equation (2) on both national time series and regional panel data.
25 
The large increase in the log college wage premium, from 0.313 in 1950 to 0.618 in 2005 
(see Figure 6), took place while the relative supply of college workers greatly increased.  The 
college graduate share of full-time equivalent employment increased from 7.8 percent in 1950 to 
31.8 percent in 2005 and the college equivalent share increased from 12.4 percent to 46.2 
percent.
26  Rapid secular growth in the relative demand for college workers is needed to 
reconcile a rising college wage premium with these large increases in college relative supply.  
Long-run shifts in the industrial and occupational mix of employment toward more education-
intensive sectors and jobs have played an important role in rapid secular growth in the relative 
demand for skills.
27 
Furthermore, substantial evidence suggests skill-biased technological change has been the 
primary contributor to rising relative demand for skills.  In recent decades, the relative 
employment of more-skilled workers has increased rapidly within detailed industries and 
individual establishments despite sharp increases in their relative wages.
28  The adoption of new 
technologies (and associated organizational changes), more R&D, and greater capital-intensity of 
                                                 
24 See table 8.2 of Goldin and Katz (2008).  Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) uncover almost identical 
estimates of sSU  for a variety of specifications of time trends estimated on data for 1963 to 2005. 
25 Katz and Autor (1999) review much of this literature. 
26 These tabulations use the 1950 Census IPUMS and 2005 CPS MORG for the work force aged 18 to 65 
years. 
27 See, for example, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Goldin and Katz (1998), and Juhn and Murphy 
(1995). 
28 See Dunne, Haltiwanger and Troske (1997) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998).  Foreign outsourcing 
of less-skilled jobs is another possible explanation for this pattern but large within-industry shifts towards 
more skilled workers have been pervasive even in sectors with little or no observed international trade or 
outsourcing activity.   15 
production have been strongly associated with a higher utilization of more-skilled workers in 
firms and industries.  Evidence of technology-skill complementarity has been associated with the 
electrification of the factory in the early twentieth century and the introduction of computer-
based technologies more recently.
29  
Changes in the college wage premium and in the relative supply and demand for skilled 
(college equivalent) workers are given in Table 1 for selected periods from 1915 to 2005.
30  The 
college wage premium, as can be seen in col. (1), was about the same in 2005 as in 1915.  Thus, 
supply and demand forces kept pace over the long run each growing at about 2.9 percent per year 
on average.  On the other hand, from 1915 to 1980, supply growth substantially outstripped 
demand growth.  The pattern was reversed beginning in 1980.  Although our estimates imply 
faster growth in the relative demand for college workers since 1950 than in the first half of the 
twentieth century, they do not imply particularly fast demand growth from 1980 to 2005 and, in 
fact, suggest a slowdown in demand growth since 1990.   
A key message from Table 1 is that a sharp slowdown in skill supply growth rather than a 
persistent acceleration in demand growth has been the driving force behind the large rise in the 
college wage premium from 1980 to 2005.  Consider the following, the college wage premium 
did not rise from 1960 to 1980 but increased by 0.90 percent per annum from 1980 to 2005.  At 
the same time, relative demand growth was slightly slower from 1980 to 2005 (3.76 percent per 
annum) than it had been from 1960 to 1980 (3.85 percent per annum).  In contrast, the growth of 
                                                 
29 See Goldin and Katz (1998, 2008) on skill-biased technological change in the early twentieth century, 
Griliches (1969) on capital-skill complementarity in the mid-twentieth century, and Doms, Dunne, and 
Troske (1997) and Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) for more recent evidence on technology adoption 
and skill utilization. 
30 The figures in the table assumesSU = 1.64.  We measure skill supplies in efficiency units taking into 
account systematic differences in productivity (wages) by age, sex, and education within each skill 
aggregate and adjusting for changes in the age-sex-education group composition of hours worked within 
each skill aggregate.   16 
the relative supply of college workers decreased from 3.89 percent per annum from 1960 to 1980 
to 2.26 percent per annum from 1980 to 2005.  Thus, the deceleration in relative supply growth 
more than fully explains the post-1980 rise in the college wage premium. 
Our supply and demand framework is a useful tool for most of the 1915 to 2005 period, 
but certain anomalies that call out for a more nuanced explanation.  For example, the implied 
negative relative demand growth in the 1940s is probably picking up strong institutional 
interventions in wage setting during World War II and a surge in unionization.  Similarly, some 
of the rapid implied demand growth in the 1950s may reflect a partial unraveling of these 
institutional forces.  The fast skill demand growth in the 1980s may also reflect a weakening of 
wage-setting institutions that had supported the earnings of non-college workers, such as the 
steady erosion of the real value of the federal minimum wage from 1981 to 1990 and the steep 
decline in unionization. 
Technology, we conclude from Table 1, has been racing ahead of education in the recent 
period because educational growth has been sluggish, not because the rate of skill-biased 
technical change has accelerated.  What drove rapid relative skill supply growth for most of the 
twentieth century and what accounts for the post-1980 slowdown in skill supply growth? 
National skill supplies can change because of shifts in the education distribution of the 
native-born work force and because of immigration.  Immigration was a major source of U.S. 
labor force growth in the early twentieth century, became much less important with the 
imposition of immigration restrictions in the 1920s, and has surged in recent decades after 
immigration reform in 1965.  The foreign born share of the U.S. work force declined from 
around 21 percent in 1915 to 5.4 percent in 1970 before rising to 15.1 percent in 2005.
31   
                                                 
31 These estimates are from tabulations using the 1910, 1920 and 1970 Census IPUMS and 2005 CPS 
MORG.   17 
Immigrants had considerably less schooling than U.S. born workers in the early twentieth 
century.  Recent waves of immigrants have a bimodal education distribution relative to the U.S. 
born.  Immigrants are disproportionately found among those that have no high school education 
and, at the same time, among those who have greater than a college degree.
32   
The relative supply of skilled (college equivalent) to unskilled (high school equivalent) 
workers can be decomposed into native born and immigrant components as follows: 

























































1 1         (3) 
 
where N jt ( M jt ) = supply of U.S. born (immigrant) workers in skill group j in year t and 
L N M j j j t t t = + .
33  The first term of the right side of the equation (3) is the native contribution to 
the log skill supply ratio.  The second term, in brackets, is the immigrant contribution.   
We use equation (3) to assess contributions of the U.S. born and immigrants to changes 
in skill supplies in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.  The decline in the immigrant share of the 
work force modestly contributed to relative skill supply growth from 1915 to 1970 and the recent 
surge in unskilled immigration has played a small role in the slowdown of skill supply growth.   
But long-run skill supply growth has been dominated by growing educational attainment 
of the U.S. born.  The post-1980 slowdown in skill supply growth has resulted mainly because of 
a slower growth in the education of the U.S. born.  The rate of growth of the relative supply of 
college equivalents declined by 1.62 percent per year, that is from 3.89 percent per year for 1960 
to 1980 to 2.27 percent per year for 1980 to 2005.  Of that decrease in the growth rate of the 
relative supply of college equivalents, 1.40 percent per year (86 percent of the total) was due to 
                                                 
32 See Goldin and Katz (2008, table 8.5). 
33 This decomposition approach follows Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997).   18 
the slowdown in the relative supply of the college educated among native-born Americans.  Only 
0.22 percent per year (14 percent of the total) was due to immigration.   
Changes in the growth of relative skill supplies of the U.S. born can arise from changes in 
the growth of the educational attainment of successive birth cohorts as well as from changes in 
the size of entering cohorts from baby booms and baby busts.  The main source of rising national 
skill supplies from 1915 to 1980 was the rapidly increasing educational attainment of successive 
cohorts of the U.S. born.  Similarly, the main factor in the slowing of skill supply growth since 
1980 has been slower growth in the educational attainment of post-1950 cohorts of the U.S. born.  
These trends are shown in Figure 7 which plots the mean years of schooling (measured at age 
30) for the 1876 to 1980 birth cohorts of U.S natives.   
Educational attainment increased rapidly for the 1876 to 1950 birth cohorts. The growth 
of educational attainment accelerated with the high school movement in the 1910s and thus for 
those born starting around 1900.  Each generation of Americans born in the first half of the 
twentieth century had about two more years of schooling on average than their parents.  
Educational attainment increased by 4.67 years (or 0.93 years per decade) from 8.49 for those 
born in 1900 to 13.16 years for those born in 1950.  In contrast, those born in 1975 have only 
0.74 more years of schooling (0.30 years per decade) than their parents’ generation born in 1950. 
We decompose the growth of relative skill supplies of the U.S. born into educational 
attainment growth across cohorts and changes in cohort size.
34  Of the total decline in the growth 
rate of the domestic college supply, 1.4 percent per year (3.83 – 2.43) from 1960-80 to 1980-
2005 (col. 3 of Table 1), almost 70 percent (0.97 percent per year) was due to the slowdown in 
the growth of educational attainment across successive birth cohorts.  The deceleration in the 
                                                 
34 The methodology is analogous to that based on equation (3) for decomposing overall relative skill 
supply growth into immigrant and native-born components and uses data on skill supplies by single year 
of age birth cohorts.   19 
educational attainment of the U.S. born explains a 0.59 percent per year rise in the college wage 
premium (for sSU   = 1.64) out of the actual increase of 0.90 percent per year from 1980 to 2005. 
The slower growth of educational attainment for the U.S. born after 1950 is the largest 
source of the post-1980 increase in the college wage premium.  Accelerated growth of 
educational attainment from increased access to public high schools starting around 1910 was the 
major factor in the narrowing of the high school wage premium from 1915 to 1940.
35  In both 
periods, the growth of skill supply through changes in educational attainment was paramount. 
The differences in skill supply growth in the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
raise the question of whether we have reached an upper bound for educational attainment.  We 
do not think so.  Other OECD nations currently have achieved far higher secondary school 
graduation rates than the United States and some have passed us in four-year college completion 
rates.
36  More convincing is that the returns to further educational investments continue to be 
substantial from marginal expansions in financial aid and in access to college as well as from 
recent increases in state compulsory schooling requirements.
37   
 
III. The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market 
The U.S. wage distribution spread out monotonically and rapidly from 1979 to 1987, but 
then polarized.  Ever since around 1987, upper- and lower-tail wage inequality have diverged 
with a continuing persistent rise in upper-tail wage inequality and a slight reversal of inequality 
                                                 
35 See Goldin and Katz (2007, 2008) for a supply-demand analysis of the high school graduate wage 
premium. 
36 OECD (2006) reports the U.S. high school graduation rate in 2004 at 75 percent as opposed to 83 
percent among European Union nations.  The U.S. was in the bottom third of 26 OECD nations in the 
high school graduation rate in 2004.  The U.S. also ranked only seventh out of the 20 richest OECD 
nations in secondary school completion among 25 to 34 year olds in 2004 even after including GED 
recipients as secondary school completers.  The OECD data also indicate that U.S. is at about the OECD 
average for four-year college completion rates among young cohorts trailing 12 nations. 
37 See Card (2001) and Oreopoulos (2007).   20 
growth in the lower half of the distribution (see Figures 3 and 4).  The polarization pattern can 
also be observed in educational wage differentials. The wage gap between post-college educated 
and college educated workers has continued to expand rapidly since the late 1980s, while the 
growth in the wage gap between high school graduates and dropouts has abated.
38   
A more nuanced view of skill biased technological change directly examines how rapid 
price declines in computer technology affect the demand for job tasks and serves to explain 
many details of the recent wage polarization.  David Autor, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane 
(ALM) have amassed evidence consistent with a task demand framework in which 
computerization has non-monotone impacts on the demand for skill.
39  Changes in the 
organization of work associated with computerization raise the demand for the cognitive and 
interpersonal skills (called “abstract tasks”) used by educated professionals and managers and 
reduce the demand for the clerical and routine analytical and mechanical skills (called “routine 
tasks”) that comprised many middle-educated white collar and manufacturing production jobs.  
Computerization has probably had little direct impact on the demand for the non-routine manual 
skills (called “manual tasks”) used in many low-skilled service jobs (such as some health aides, 
security guards, and cleaners) and in many jobs in the building trades.
40  
The ALM framework suggests that computerization has led to changes in the 
organization of work that have raised the demand for higher-educated workers, depressed the 
demand for “middle-educated” workers, and left the lower echelons of the wage distribution, in 
                                                 
38 See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2007). 
39 See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).  Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) extend the ALM framework 
and show that declining computer prices may initially lead to monotonically increasing shifts in skill 
demand (if, at first, routine tasks in low-wage jobs are easier to computerize than routine tasks in higher-
wage jobs) followed by non-monotonic shifts favoring the top and bottom at the expense of the middle of 
the wage distribution.  
40 The interpersonal and environmental adaptability demanded by these manual tasks, particularly for 
many in-person services, have proven difficult to computerize to date.  The in-person aspect of many 
service jobs using such manual tasks also serve to insulate them from international offshoring.   21 
the in-person service sector, comparatively unscathed.  The indirect effects of computerization in 
reducing the communication and coordination costs that facilitate international outsourcing are 
likely to have reinforced this pattern.   
    The computer task demand hypothesis suggests that wage polarization is substantially 
a demand-side phenomenon induced by rising relative demands for high- and low-skill tasks.  An 
implication is that employment demand growth (and employment growth) should have been 
monotonically rising in the skill distribution in the 1980s and been non-monotonic (lowest in the 
middle) since the late 1980s.   
To investigate this implication, Figure 8 plots changes in the share of total hours worked 
in the U.S. economy by occupation skill (education) percentile for 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 
2000.  During the 1980s employment shares declined substantially at the bottom of the skill 
distribution, and employment growth increased continuously when moving up the skill 
distribution.  In contrast, employment growth polarized in the 1990s.  The most rapid 
employment growth was in the highest-skill jobs, declines in employment shares occurred for 
middle-skill jobs, and flat or even rising employment shares occurred in the lowest-skill 
occupations.  The polarization of employment growth since 1990 represents a sharp break in a 
long-line of successive technological advances that have generated monotonically rising demand 
by skill level since at least 1940.
41  Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that the mean gap in 
employment share growth rates between “college jobs” (those in the top half of the skill 
distribution) and “non-college jobs” (those in the bottom half) shrank from the 1980s to the 
1990s in a manner consistent with the slowdown in relative demand growth for college 
equivalents from the 1980s to the 1990s found in Table 1.  
                                                 
41 For example, Juhn and Murphy (1995) examine the relative demand for occupation-industry cells 
(ranked by skill in terms of average wage percentiles) and find labor demand growth monotonically rising 
in skill for 1940 to 1980.   22 
The computer task demand hypothesis has implications concerning within-group shifts in 
skill demand and wage inequality by education group.  Computers are strong complements to the 
abstract tasks of college graduates in top-end professional and management positions whereas 
they substitute for the routine tasks of lower-end college graduates in middle management and 
certain professional positions.  Computers substitute for manufacturing production and 
administrative jobs often found in the upper-half of the non-college wage distribution, but have 
little direct impact on lower-end service jobs for non-college workers.  The implication is that 
within-group wage inequality should have been sharply rising for college graduates and possibly 
even declining for high school workers since the late 1980s.  And that is, in fact, exactly what the 
CPS wage data show.
42    
 
IV. Conclusions 
The U.S. wage structure has evolved across the last century: narrowing from 1910 to 
1950, relatively stable in the 1950s and 1960s, rapidly widening in a monotonic fashion during 
the 1980s, and polarizing since the late 1980s.  The majority of the large increase in U.S. wage 
inequality since 1980 is accounted for by expanded educational wage differentials dominated by 
sharply increased returns to post-secondary schooling.  Of course, wage inequality has also 
increased substantially within education groups since 1980 particularly for the college educated. 
  Skill-biased technological change has generated rapid secular growth in the relative 
demand for more-educated workers for at least the past century.  But rapid increases in the 
supply of skills, from rising educational attainment of the U.S. work force, more than kept pace 
with relative skill demands for most of the twentieth century and served to reduce educational 
                                                 
42 Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b) document rising within-group wage inequality 
for both male and female college graduates from 1988 to the early 2000s and little change or declining 
within-group wage inequality for high school workers over the same period.   23 
wage differentials and narrow the wage structure.  A sharp decline in relative skill supply growth 
driven by a slowdown in the growth of the educational attainment of successive cohorts of the 
U.S. born has been the largest contributor to the surge in the college wage premium since 1980. 
   The economic returns to completing high school today appear substantial and the 
economic benefits to college and post-college schooling are at historically high levels.  But the 
educational attainment of American youth is not rising as rapidly as it did over much of the 
twentieth century.  Although college enrollment rates among new high school graduates have 
been rising since the early 1980s in response to high college returns, the traditionally-measured 
U.S. high school graduation rate (not including GEDs) has been stagnant for three decades and 
the share of young adults completing four-year college degrees has risen only modestly for post-
1950 birth cohorts (especially for males).
43  After leading the world in education for most of the 
twentieth century, U.S. young adults are now in the middle of the pack in the OECD in terms of 
education attainment.
44  Expanding the educational attainment of U.S youth requires increasing 
the college readiness of children from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds and assuring the 
financial access to higher education of the college ready.
45 
The polarization of the U.S. wage structure since the late 1980s has been accompanied by 
a polarization of employment growth.  U.S. employment has bifurcated into high-wage and low-
wage jobs at the expense of traditional middle class jobs.  Changes in task demand from the 
adoption of computer-based technologies have been a major source of this shift in the pattern of 
                                                 
43 See Goldin and Katz (2008) for a detailed documentation and analysis of trends in U.S. high school 
graduation rates and in college enrollment and graduation rates as well as of policies to increase 
educational attainment.   
44 The OECD (2006) reports that the United State ranked 11
th for males and 10
th for females out of 30 
countries in its summary measure of educational attainment (mean years of schooling) for 25 to 34 year 
olds in 2004. 
45 See Heckman and Krueger (2003) for different perspectives on the problems with the U.S. education 
and training system and on the effectiveness of alternative human capital policies.   24 
skill demands.  The growth of international offshoring is likely to have reinforced these changes 
in skill demands.  A key uncertainty with respect to future U.S. wage structure developments 
concerns the longer run impacts on skill demands and worker bargaining power from increased 
international economic integration and greater offshoring opportunities.  Top-end knowledge 
jobs are likely to benefit from growing international markets and foreign offshoring is unlikely to 
be able to substitute for in-person services and for construction jobs.
46  The returns to abstract 
skills from college and post-college training are likely to remain high and demands are likely to 
grow for interpersonal (soft) skills found in in-person services.   
Our education system will need to be better positioned to produce individuals with 
abstract and interpersonal skills to have a better chance of restoring rapid growth with shared 
prosperity.  A complementary approach would be to try “professionalize” the growing work 
force of in-person service workers and to develop labor market institutions to enhance the 
bargaining clout of such workers.  Such policy changes are first steps toward shifting America 
from its current path of increasingly “growing apart” back to a trajectory of shared prosperity. 
     
                                                 
46 See Blinder (2007) and Levy and Murnane (2006) on how offshoring may affect the U.S. labor market.   25 
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Table 1 
Changes in the College Wage Premium and the Supply and Demand for College Educated 
Workers: 1915 to 2005 (100 × Annual Log Changes) 
 
    Changes in Relative Supply   























(￿SU = 1.64) 
(5) 
1915-40  -0.56  2.82  2.57  0.25  1.90 
1940-50  -1.86  2.69  2.48  0.21  -0.36 
1950-60  0.83  3.23  3.02  0.21  4.60 
1960-70  0.69  2.86  2.72  0.14  4.00 
1970-80  -0.74  4.91  4.94  -0.02  3.69 
1980-90  1.51  2.69  2.85  -0.16  5.18 
1990-2000  0.58  2.26  2.35  -0.09  3.21 
1990-2005  0.50  1.99  2.15  -0.16  2.81 
           
1940-60  -0.51  2.96  2.75  0.21  2.12 
1960-80  -0.02  3.89  3.83  0.06  3.85 
1980-2005  0.90  2.27  2.43  -0.16  3.76 
1915-1980  -0.38  3.19  3.01  0.18  2.57 
1915-2005  -0.02  2.94  2.85  0.08  2.90 
 
Sources: The underlying data are from tables 8.1 and 8.6 of Goldin and Katz (2008) and are 
derived from the 1915 Iowa State Census, 1940 to 2000 Census IPUMS, and 1980 to 2005 CPS 
MORG samples. 
 
Notes: The “relative wage” is the log (college/high school) wage differential, which is the 
college wage premium.  The underlying college wage premium series is plotted in Figure 6.  The 
relative supply and demand measures are for college “equivalents” (college graduates plus half 
of those with some college) relative to high school “equivalents” (those with 12 or fewer years of 
schooling and half of those with some college).  Relative skill supplies are measured in 
efficiency units.  The native-born and immigrant relative supply columns decompose the overall 
relative skill supply growth into the native-born and immigrant contributions using equation (3) 
in the text.  The log relative demand measure ( t D ) is based on equation (2) in the text and is 
given by  ) / ln( ) / ln(
t t t t U S SU U S t w w L L D s + = under the assumption that sSU = 1.64. 
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Figure 1: Annual Growth Rate of Real Income across the Family Income Distribution: 





Lowest fifth mid fifth
1947 to 1973
1973 to 2005
2nd fifth 4th fifth top fifth top 5%
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, tables F2, F3, and F7. 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f03ar.html, updated September 15, 2006. 
 
Notes: The figure plots the annual percentage growth rate in mean real family income by quintile 
and for the top 5 percent of families for 1947 to 1973 and 1973 to 2005.  Incomes are converted 
to constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS).  The income 
concept used is the official U.S. Census Bureau measure of pre-tax, post-transfer money income. 
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Figure 2: Three Measures of Wage Inequality: College/High School Premium, Male 90/10 
Overall Inequality, and Male 90/10 Residual Inequality 
 
Panel A: March CPS Full-Time Weekly Earnings, 1963 to 2005 


































































































Panel B:  CPS MORG Hourly Earnings, 1973 to 2006 
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Sources and Notes to Figure 2:  Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008, figure 2) with panel B updated 
to 2006.  The 90-10 residual log wage differential uses the wage residuals from separate 
regressions in each year of log wages on a full set of age and schooling dummies and interactions 
among the schooling dummies and a quartic in age.  The college-high school log wage 
differential is a fixed-weighted average of the wage differential between those with at least a 
B.A. degree (16 or more years of schooling) to those with exactly a high school degree (12 years 
of schooling) estimated separately each year by sex for four different experience groups. 
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Figure 3: Log Hourly Wage Differentials, 90-50 and 50-10: 1974 to 2005 (three-year centered 
moving averages), Males and Females Combined 
 













































G 90-50 log hourly wage differential, all




Source: 1973 to 2006 CPS May/MORG files.  33 
Figure 4: Changes in Log Real Hourly Wages by Percentile: 1974 to 1988 and 1988 to 2005 
(three-year centered moving averages) 
 
















































Sources: 1973 to 1975 CPS May files and 1987 to 1989 and 2004 to 2006 CPS MORG files.  34 
Figure 5: Male Wage Inequality, Gini and 90-10: 1937 to 2005 
 




































































Sources and Notes: 
 
Male 90-10 Log Weekly Wage Differential: Census IPUMS for 1940 to 1970 (covering earnings 
years 1939 to 1969) and the March CPS samples for 1964 to 2006 (covering earnings years 1963 
to 2005) for male FTFY wage and salary workers.  The Census IPUMS samples cover males 18 
to 64 years old and the March sample cover males 16 to 64 years old.  The 1963 to 2005 plotted 
numbers are directly from the March CPS and the 1939 to 1959 plotted numbers are scaled so 
that the 1959 to 1969 change in the 90-10 log weekly wage differential in the graph equals the 
actual 1959 to 1969 change in for the Census IPUMS.  
 
Male Gini Coefficient: The plotted series is the Gini coefficient for the annual earnings of male 
commerce and industry workers for 1937 to 2004 from the Social Security Administration 
earnings history data constructed and documented by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) and 
posted at http://www.columbia.edu/~wk2110/uncovering/. 
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Figure 6: College Graduate and High School Graduate Wage Premiums: 1915 to 2005 


































College graduate wage premium









































Source: Figure 1 of chapter 8 and appendix table A8.1 in Goldin and Katz (2008). 
  
College Graduate Wage Premium:  The plotted series is a weighted average of the estimated 
college (exactly 16 years of completed schooling or bachelor’s degree) and post-college (17+ 
years of schooling or a post-baccalaureate degree) log wage premium relative to high school 
graduates (those with exactly 12 years of completed schooling or a high school diploma) for the 
year given.  The weights are the employment shares of college and post-college workers in 1980.  
We use estimates for 1940 to 1980 from the Census extended back to 1915 using the 1915 to 
1940 change for Iowa.  We extend the series to 1990, 2000, and 2005 by adding the changes in 
the log (college/high school) wage differentials for 1980 to 1990 for the CPS, 1990 to 2000 from 
the census, and 2000 to 2005 from the CPS to maintain consistency in the coding of education.  
 
High School Graduate Wage Premium: The plotted series is for the log (high school/eighth 
grade) wage differential.  We use the 1940 to 1980 Census estimates for the United States.  To 
maintain data consistency, we then extend this series backwards to 1915 using the 1915 to 1940 
change for Iowa and forward to 2005 using the 1980 to 1990 change from the CPS MORG, the 
1990 to 2000 change from the February 1990 CPS to the 2000 CPS MORG, and the 2000 to 
2005 change from the CPS MORG.   36 
Figure 7: Mean Years of Schooling by Birth Cohorts, U.S. Native Born: 1876 to 1980 
 































Sources: 1940 to 2000 Census of Population Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS) 
and 2005 CPS MORG. 
 
Notes: The figure plots the mean years of completed schooling by birth cohort adjusted to 30 
years of age for the U.S. born.  The log of the mean years of schooling for a birth cohort-year 
cell is the dependent variable in the age-adjustment regression that includes a full set of birth-
cohort dummies and a quartic in age as covariates.  The age-adjustment regression is run on birth 
cohort-census year cells, pooling all the IPUMS for 1940 to 2000.  The samples include all U.S. 
born residents aged 25 to 64 years.  For further details on the method and data processing see 
Goldin and Katz (2008, figure 1.4). 
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Figure 8: Changes in Occupation Employment Shares for 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000 by 
Occupational Skill Percentile 












































Source: Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008, figure 11A) based on Census IPUMS 5 percent samples 
for 1980, 1990, and 2000 for those currently employed in the civilian labor force ages 18 to 64. 
 
Notes:  The figure plots changes in log employment shares by 1980 occupational skill percentile 
(based on mean years of schooling in the occupation in 1980) using a locally weighted 
smoothing regression (bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations).   